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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates boundary decisions that determine governance structures in the telecommunication 
industry. Particularly, the inter-organizational relationship between mobile network operators and the other 
players in telecommunication industry in Ghana. The firms that do business with the mobile network 
operators  in the telecommunication industry were classed into six namely, content providers, technology 
providers, service managed partners, distributors or dealers of airtime and accessories, financial institutions 
and mobile money merchants. A sample size of 430 respondents participated in the survey. Structural 
Regression modelling using Amos 23.0 is applied to test the conceptual model.  The results support the 
predictions of the TCT logic and as well consistent with the studies of other scholars in the field of strategic 
management. Findings reveal that firms with greater investment or higher asset specificity pursue greater level 
of vertical integration. It also revealed that firms with higher transaction uncertainty pursue greater level of 
vertical integration. The results further reveal that positive influence of transaction uncertainty on vertical 
integration becomes stronger when asset specificity increases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Mobile network operators cannot expect to 
appropriately serve their wide range of customers 
alone if they are to provide the kind of services that 
customers will increasingly demand. They will be 
forced to enter into business relationships with a 
range of organizations. This therefore, requires that 
the network operators embrace the inter-
organizational relationship governance concept and 
its implications. The key to the objective of 
maximizing firm performance is the appropriate 
choice of corporate governance mechanisms for 
inter-organizational relationships. The way a 
relationship is governed affects the functioning of the 
organisations involved. Proper governance can 
increase the health and prosperity (performance) of 
the organisations. Appropriate decision making is an  
 
 
 
important part of the inter-organisational relationship 
governance. In light of this, firms need to reassess 
boundary decisions that determine governance 
structures.  Research suggests that the divergent 
resource requirements necessitate different 
governance structures, however, optimal boundary 
choices have not been empirically 
investigated(Grosvenor, Gothard, McWilliam, 
Supriono, & Gray, 1995; Tsang, 2000).  In response 
to this gap, this study examines how firm resources 
and exchange attributes impact inter-organizational 
relationship governance structures. First a discussion 
of the literature related to the transaction cost 
economic theory and governance structures is 
provided, followed by hypotheses regarding the 
effects of various exchange attributes as well as the 
interactive effects of the exchange attributes on 
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governance structures.  Next, the methods used to 
test the hypotheses are presented. The presentation of 
results and discussions are followed. Lastly, 
conclusion, limitation and implications for future 
research are offered. 
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
FORMULATION 
 
2.1: The Transaction Theory and the 
Governance Structures  
 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) theory can be 
viewed as a first endeavour in analysing economic 
exchanges, or transactions, rather than the goods or 
services, deviant from the neoclassical perspective of 
the firm. The transaction cost economics principle 
has been introduced by Coase (1937) but has become 
widely known by Oliver E Williamson (1979)  by 
defining the cost of transactions in making or buying 
a product.  Theory suggests that firms and markets 
are the alternative governance structures with 
contrasting exchange cost. As per TCE theory, the 
level of vertical integration is determined by the 
relative costs of using markets or employing 
resources within the firm. For instance, if the costs of 
producing in-house are higher than the market, a buy 
decision is made and if producing in-house is cheaper 
than the market a make decision is made. The market 
or hierarchy structures of production are the two 
essential dimensions of TCE. Market governance 
structures are used when the activities are organized 
external to the firm and hierarchy governance 
structures are used when the activities are organized 
internal to the firm (Oliver E Williamson, 1979, 1981; 
Oliver E. Williamson, 2002). Legal contracts and 
prices are the coordinating mechanisms in market 
governance structures, whereas employment 
contracts and authority are the coordinating 
mechanisms in hierarchy governance structures (De 
Reuver, 2009; de Reuver & Bouwman, 2012).  
  Research suggests governance decisions depend on 
the interaction between two main assumptions of 
human behaviour (bounded rationality and 
opportunism) and transaction exchange attributes 
(asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency)(Oliver 
E Williamson, 1985, 1999; Oliver E. Williamson, 
2002) .  
The bounded rationality assumption presents human 
beings as restricted in their decision making capacity. 
It can be thought of as purposefully rational 
behaviour that is limited on the grounds that decision 
makers recognize just a predetermined number of 
alternatives and know about just a couple of 
outcomes of these  alternatives(Tsang, 2000) .  In 
whole, bounded rationality makes it difficult to 
indicate all possibilities in contractual agreements, 
driving exchange partners to write incomplete 
contracts that could lead to subsequent adaptability 
problems. Opportunism comes about when 
management behaviour is not in the greatest 
advantage of the firm. According to O. Williamson 
(2005) safeguarding and motivating forces are not 
always effective, leading him  to propose that 
markets and hybrids are ill equipped to manage 
transactions requiring coordinated adaptation to 
complex problems. At the point when there are few 
exchange risks and transaction costs are low, market 
contracts will be ideally effective (Oliver E 
Williamson, 1979, 1999). However, when transaction 
costs are perceived as high, hierarchical governance 
is more efficient as it allows the firm to adjust to 
changing conditions with lower transaction costs, 
thereby improving its adaptation ability (Oliver E 
Williamson, 1999). 
Accordingly, the way firms govern transactions 
should account for exchange hazards, transaction 
costs, and adaptation capabilities of each governance 
mode (O. Williamson, 2005; Oliver E Williamson, 
1991; Oliver E. Williamson, 2002).However, it is the 
transaction’s attributes, some of which are more 
subject to bounded rationality constraints and 
opportunism than others, that provide the starting 
point for decisions regarding how a transaction will 
be governed.   
      Transaction cost economics has been a popular 
framework for examining the effectiveness of inter-
organizational boundary decisions(Poppo & Zenger, 
2002; Tadelis & Williamson, 2012; Tsang, 
2000).The model presumes that performance is 
improved when there is congruence between a firm’s 
governance structure and transactional attributes in a 
way that minimizes costs(O. Williamson, 2005; 
Oliver E. Williamson, 2002).Empirical research 
supports the theory that firms seek to minimize costs 
through vertical integration and quasi-integration 
governance structures for the purpose of 
safeguarding transaction specific investments and 
adapting to environmental uncertainty of 
transactions(Heide & John, 1988; John, 1990; 
Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; Wathne & Heide, 2000) .  
In other words, transaction costs create adaptation 
problems when transactions are not matched to the 
appropriate governance mode(Oliver E Williamson, 
1999). Thus O. Williamson (2005)     contends that 
transactions, which differ in the attributes (e.g., 
uncertainty or asset specificity), must be matched to 
the most efficient governance structure, which differ 
in their costs and capabilities in protecting firms from 
exchange hazards. Accordingly, because transaction 
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costs impact a firm’s adaptation capability, they will 
shape the decision to use market, hierarchical, or 
hybrid governance.  
2.2. Exchange Conditions of Resources  
   
 Exchange conditions of transactions raise transaction 
costs and can create market failure(Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006) . Leading to the 
decision to produce internal to the firm or integrate 
vertically. These conditions are; ‘asset specificity’, 
‘uncertainty’, and ‘transaction frequency’(O. 
Williamson, 2005; Oliver E. Williamson, 2002). 
They are the conditions surrounding the transaction 
in the dimensions of governance structure (markets 
and hierarchies) and are the discernible measures as 
recognized by(O. Williamson, 2005; Oliver E 
Williamson, 1979; Oliver E. Williamson, 2002). He 
predicts a positive relationship between these 
transaction attributes and more integrated governance 
structure.  In the following paragraphs, the different 
common conditions are described.  
 
2.2.1 Asset Specificity  
At the heart of TCE theory is the assumption that 
efficient production necessitates investments in 
physical and human assets that are transaction 
specific(Poppo & Zenger, 2002; O. Williamson, 
2005; Oliver E. Williamson, 2002) .Although 
transaction cost rationale assumes that firm specific 
assets reduce costs, these assets are also hypothesized 
to damage the performance of simple market 
governance because of costly contractual safeguards 
to protect from opportunistic behaviour(Oliver E 
Williamson, 1999; Oliver E. Williamson, 2002). 
Asset specificity refers to the level of unique 
investment required to support a transaction.  It 
permits reliance between partners(Jones, Hesterly, & 
Borgatti, 1997). Exchanges   can range from non-
specific to highly specific, and the level of asset 
specificity influences governance structure(O. 
Williamson, 2005; Oliver E. Williamson, 2002). A 
high level of asset specificity of a transaction entails 
customized exchanges or assets to the transaction. 
Transaction exchanges supported by non-specific 
assets do not pose significant exchange hazards 
because the assets can easily be redeployed without 
greater loss of significant worth. Such assets can be 
more easily redeployed than highly specific assets 
since alternate partners interested in the transaction 
of the asset can be identified and along these lines 
lessening the risk of opportunism(Mahoney & 
Pandian, 1992). As indicated by TCT, when the 
threat of opportunism is low, there is little need for 
formal controls or dispute resolution mechanisms and 
therefore, markets and relational (Trust)  governance 
structures are preferred to the hierarchical  
governance structure(Tadelis & Williamson, 2012; O. 
Williamson, 2005). However, when a high level of 
unique investments is made it cannot be easily be 
redeployed to different uses, and if transactors’ 
endeavour or try to redeploy the assets they incur 
increased transaction cost. With this, there is a 
safeguarding problem as market competition will 
exploit the assets opportunistically, thereby 
increasing the transaction costs. The authority 
relationships and hierarchical control procedures 
through vertical integration are assumed to have 
greater safeguarding capabilities and are viewed as 
the solution to the problem (Geyskens et al., 2006; 
Van de Vrande, Lemmens, & Vanhaverbeke, 2006; 
Van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, & Duysters, 2009).  
In sum, support has been found for the key 
explanation of boundary choice: that increasing asset 
specificity leads to diminishing effectiveness of 
market governance because markets lack effective 
mechanisms for resolving coordination problems and 
opportunism in specialized exchanges(Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002). Base on the evidences from literature, 
we hypothesise that:  
Hypothesis 1: Firms with greater investment or 
higher asset specificity will pursue greater level of 
vertical integration. 
2.2.2 Uncertainty 
 A second determinant is that of transaction 
uncertainty which refers to any kind of unknown 
variables in a transaction or variables that are 
extremely   unpredictable in order to be catered for in 
the terms of transaction or contract. It also arises 
when the performance cannot be verified 
afterwards(Geyskens et al., 2006).It can be broken up 
into environmental uncertainty and behavioural 
uncertainty.    Environmental uncertainty refers to 
unpredictability outside the firm’s boundaries(O. 
Williamson, 2005; Oliver E. Williamson, 
2002).When environmental uncertainty is low, there 
are few unanticipated disturbances. Transaction costs 
are low since firms can anticipate and specify ex ante 
appropriate adaptations to disturbances in market and 
hybrid contracts(Oliver E Williamson, 1985). When 
environmental uncertainty is high, however, 
boundedly rational economic actors cannot anticipate 
environmental disturbances and specify all 
appropriate contractual adaptations.  The 
environmental changes that require adaptations to an 
agreement raise transaction costs and can be solved 
by hierarchical mechanisms of a contract or authority. 
Thus, the higher the environmental uncertainty, the 
greater the likelihood that contracts will be 
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incomplete.  When contracts are incomplete, the 
threat of opportunism and transaction costs increase 
because adaptations are needed in response to 
environmental disturbances (Tadelis & Williamson, 
2012; O. Williamson, 2005; Oliver E Williamson, 
1999; Oliver E. Williamson, 2002).  Increased 
environmental uncertainty confuses managers’ 
abilities to predict contingencies, which makes 
contracts more incomplete. When contracts are more 
incomplete, however, higher transaction costs result 
because bargaining and renegotiations are needed to 
resolve disputes arising from unforeseen 
contingencies. Behavioural uncertainty refers to 
performance measurement difficulties(Tadelis & 
Williamson, 2012).Performance measurement 
difficulties are low when outputs are easy to monitor 
and evaluate. When outputs are easily observed and 
evaluated, the value of a transaction can be assessed 
and rewards can be linked to productivity(Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972). In contrast, performance 
measurement difficulties are high when outputs 
cannot be easily monitored and evaluated. The threat 
of opportunism is increased on the grounds that 
transactors can intentionally bring down output or 
lessen quality in ways that might not be detected by 
others.  Base on the support from literature, we 
hypothesise that:  
     H2:  The degree of vertical integration will be 
higher for firms with higher transaction uncertainty. 
2.2.3 Frequency of Transaction 
A third condition is frequency of transaction. It is an 
exchange attribute that also affects governance 
structure(Noordewier, John, & Nevin, 1990; Tadelis 
& Williamson, 2012). It involves the extent to which 
the transaction reoccurs between the organizations. 
Agreeing  to Tadelis and Williamson (2012), 
transaction frequency can be categorized as one-time, 
occasional, or recurring. When frequency is one-time 
or intermittent, transaction costs and adaptation 
problems are often low since these transactions pose 
fewer threats of opportunism. So, contracts can be 
more easily written when transactions are one-time 
or intermittent. If a transaction is to transpire for a 
brief period, transactors could more easily anticipate 
and specify contractual contingencies. In like manner, 
firms’ adaptation capabilities are not heavily 
influenced. Accordingly, non-recurring or repeating 
transactions have less threats of opportunism, and 
lesserly affect transaction costs or adaptability. Since 
markets preserve more powerful incentives than 
hierarchy and such transactions have little impact on 
firms, they are therefore taken off by market (Atalay, 
Hortaçsu, & Syverson, 2014; Brodrechtova, 2015; 
Globerman & Schwindt, 1986; Hashimoto, 2017; 
Vinholis, Filho, Carrer, & Chaddad, 2014) . When 
transactions recur or repeat, however, hierarchy can 
bring down transaction costs (O. Williamson, 2005). 
Masters and Miles (2002), for example, found that on 
accounts of costs resulting from negotiating and 
renegotiating contracts for recurring needs, market 
contracting increases transaction costs. Firms 
favoured hierarchy rather, since contracts do not need 
to be negotiated or renegotiated on progressive 
premise, accordingly decreasing transaction costs.  In 
this way, hierarchies bring down transaction costs by 
enhancing ongoing negotiating and renegotiating 
costs with other transactors. Furthermore, an 
increased frequency of transaction will reduce the 
information asymmetry between the organizations 
making hierarchical mechanisms more appropriate 
(Van de Vrande et al., 2006; Van de Vrande et al., 
2009). Therefore, we hypothesized that:  
    H3:  The degree of vertical integration will be 
higher for firms with greater transaction frequency.  
 
2.3. Interplay of transaction exchange 
condition attributes  
 
The interactive relationships of transaction exchange 
conditions might have impact on the relationship 
between transaction exchange conditions and the 
choice of governance structure (degree of 
integration). For example, the type of asset 
specificity or uncertainty may affect the relationships 
between these transaction attributes and the degree of 
integration.  
TCT predicts asset specificity as a key determinant of 
inter-organizational governance structures. Because 
of this, when asset specific investments are joined 
with other transaction attributes, for example 
uncertainty or frequency, the relationships between 
those transaction attributes and the choice of 
governance structures (degree of integration) should 
become more positive.  
 O. Williamson (2005) asserts that there is an 
interactive relationship between uncertainty 
(environmental or behavioural), asset specificity, and 
the degree of integration. He additionally asserts that 
there is an interactive relationship between frequency, 
asset specificity, and the degree of integration. The 
interplay relationships are discussed below:  
 
2.3.1. Uncertainty and Asset Specificity   
The interactive relationship between uncertainty and 
hierarchical governance is common in the 
literature(Boerner, 2002 ; David & Han, 2004).Oliver 
E Williamson (1985) ,Tadelis and Williamson (2012) 
contend that there is an interactive relationship 
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between asset specificity, uncertainty, and 
hierarchical governance. More specifically, he asserts 
that uncertainty enables greater opportunism in 
markets and hybrids only when asset specific 
investments are present(Tadelis & Williamson, 2012; 
O. Williamson, 2005). His contention is that 
“uncertainty matters little without the need for asset 
specific investments.” When buyers procure 
standardized inputs that do not require asset specific 
investments, uncertainty is less problematic on the 
grounds that non-specific investments are involved, 
which can be redeployed without significant costs. 
Given this, transactions surrounded by uncertainty 
and supported by non-specific investments can be 
governed by market contracts because there is no loss 
if disturbances occur. However, when asset 
specificity and environmental or behavioural 
uncertainty are joined, exchange hazards can surface 
due to incomplete contracts, and because assets are 
involved, the transactions are at greater risk. In 
particular, exchange hazards might increase as one 
transactor is positioned to take advantage of the other. 
Hierarchical governance can use formal controls and 
dispute resolution mechanisms to attenuate these 
hazards more efficiently than markets or 
hybrids(Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978).Along 
these lines, as asset specificity increases, exchange 
hazards caused by uncertainty increase. Support has 
been found regarding (Oliver E Williamson, 
1985)contentions on the interactive relationship 
between uncertainty, asset specificity, and 
hierarchical governance(Anderson, 1996; Coles & 
Hesterly, 1998; Walker & Weber, 1987) . We 
therefore hypothesise that: 
  H4: The positive influence of transaction 
uncertainty on vertical integration becomes stronger 
when asset specificity increases.  
 
2.3.2 Frequency and Asset Specificity   
Since one-time and occasional transactions have a 
smaller impact on firms, TCT is mainly concerned 
with recurring or repeating transactions. As 
transactions become more frequent, firms can reduce 
costs in two ways. First, transaction costs can be 
reduced by ameliorating ongoing negotiating and 
renegotiating expenses for recurring needs(Masters 
& Miles, 2002).  Second, production costs can be 
reduced by investing in asset specific 
investments(Oliver E. Williamson, 2002).When such 
investments are made, transaction costs rise because 
firms seek to reduce potential exchange hazards and 
resulting adaptation problems, and  when recurring 
transactions are supported by asset specific 
investments, exchange hazards and the resulting 
adaptation problems increase(O. Williamson, 2005). 
Hierarchies reduce exchange hazards, transaction 
costs, and the resulting adaptation problems through 
the use of formal controls and executive fiat. 
Drawing on this logic, Widener and Selto (1999) 
showed that firms tend to use internal staff when 
frequent transactions are joined with asset specific 
investments. Specifically, they found that the 
combined presence of frequency and asset specific 
investments explained 53% of the variance in degree 
of integration decisions. In addition, Masters and 
Miles (2002)found that when recurring tasks require 
some level of expertise (i.e., human asset specificity), 
most firms preferred hierarchies to other modes of 
governance.  
In sum, support has been found for the explanation of 
boundary choice, that when transactions become 
more frequent, there is incentive for firms to invest in 
specialized investments to reduce costs. However, 
these investments increase exchange hazards and 
transaction costs, and cause adaptation problems in 
markets and hybrids. Hierarchies, in contrast, reduce 
exchange hazards and the resulting transaction costs 
and adaptability problems when asset specific 
investments are present. Thus, when frequency and 
asset specificity are joined, firms favour increased 
integration to reduce transaction costs and the 
resulting adaptability problems. Therefore, we 
hypothesise that:   
   H5: The positive influence of transaction frequency 
on vertical integration becomes stronger    when asset 
specificity increases. 
 
3.0: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The data for the study was collected through a survey 
questionnaire between February and June, 2017. The 
respondents were classed into seven groups, namely: 
mobile network operators being the principal firms 
that do businesses with the other participants in the 
study, content providers, technology providers, 
financial institutions (Banks), service managed 
partners, mobile merchants and distributors/dealers. 
The respondents were the managers and staff at 
executive positions who take part in transaction 
partnerships decisions. The mobile network operators 
constitute 8.3% of the total respondents, the 
distributor or dealers of scratch cards and dealers in 
mobile devices and accessories also constitute 
12.6%.The service manage partners form3.5% while 
financial institutions(banks) constitute 10.7% of the 
total participants. The other participants such as 
technology providers form7% of the total 
respondents. The technology providers are large 
firms that provide special services to the mobile 
network operators. The content providers are small 
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firms that develop programmes to enrich the contents 
of the mobile network operators. They are usually 
many and therefore constitute 23.3%, and are the 
second largest participants of the total respondents. 
The last category is the mobile money merchants. 
These are small firms that operate mobile money 
business. They are scattered or spread all over the 
country and constitute the largest participants 34.9% 
of the total participants. Efforts were made to ensure 
that the right respondents were engaged. The 
respondents were all found in Ghana. Finding 
respondents for this type of survey was a difficulty, 
since no database exists for all relevant partners 
engaged in transaction partnership in the 
telecommunication industry from any national 
database. However, we managed to get a list of 
transaction partners in the telecommunication 
industry from the database of the mobile network 
operators. These lists aggregated and constitute the 
total population of transaction partners in the 
telecommunication industry. Transaction actors that 
transacted with more than one mobile network 
operator were recognised as one actor in the 
population. This was to avoid duplication of 
transaction partners. 
 Research assistants were engaged to help in the data 
collection. They were adequately trained for that 
purpose. To explain the questionnaire and its context, 
the participants were offered a detailed background 
of the study either through an introductory letter or 
meeting. Relevant areas or topics that needed to be 
responded were covered. The broad topics included, 
transaction governance, modes of transaction 
exchanges in transaction partnerships and how these 
transaction exchanges influence their choice of 
governance modes. Participants were given adequate 
time to prepare themselves as well as to express 
interest in taking part of the exercise. Follow ups 
were made to identify participants who were willing 
to take part in the exercise. In the administration of 
the survey questionnaires, the research assistants 
ensured that participants submitted questionnaires 
that were completely answered and did not allow 
room for incomplete questionnaires. A total of 430 of 
completed questionnaires with valid responses for the 
survey were received. The completed questionnaires 
were thoroughly checked for response bias. In the 
analysis of data, SEM techniques were employed. 
Structural Regression modelling using Amos 23.0 is 
applied to test the conceptual model in Fig. 1. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1a : Distribution of respondents 
 
 
 
Table 1b : Measurement Scales 
 
 
 
4.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)  
 
An EFA using Maximum Likelihood with Promax 
rotation was used to see if the observed variables 
loaded together as expected, were adequately 
correlated, and met criteria of reliability and validity. 
We address each of these below for the final six-
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factor model depicted in the pattern matrix in table 2 
below:  
Table 2: Factor loadings  
  
 
4.1.1 Adequacy:  The KMO and Bartlett’s test for 
sampling adequacy was significant and the 
communalities for each variable were sufficiently 
high (all above 0.300 and most above 0.600), thus 
indicating the chosen variables were adequately 
correlated for a factor analysis. Additionally, the 
reproduced matrix had only 2% non-redundant 
residuals greater than 0.05, further confirming the 
adequacy of the variables and 6-factor model.  
 
4.1.2 Reliability: The Cronbach’s alphas for the 
extracted factors are shown below, along with their 
labels and specification. All alphas were above 0.70. 
The factors are all reflective because their indicators 
are highly correlated and are largely 
interchangeable(Jarvis, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 
2003) as shown in table 3. 
Table 3: Construct Reliability measures 
 
4.1.3 Validity 
The factors demonstrate sufficient convergent 
validity, as their loadings were all above the 
recommended minimum threshold of 0.350 for a 
samples size of 300(Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2011). 
The factors also demonstrate sufficient discriminant 
validity, as the correlation matrix shows no 
correlations above 0.700, and there are no 
problematic cross-loadings. 
 
This six-factor model had a total variance explained 
of 60%, with all extracted factors having eigen-
values above 1.0 except one, which was close at 
0.989. 
4.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
  
Model Fit: We removed contract1, contract5, 
contract6, and contract8 due to poor loading. 
Modification indices were consulted to determine if 
there was opportunity to improve the model. 
Accordingly, we co-varied the error terms between 
contract3 and contract4, also contract10 and 
contract11. Table 4 indicates that the goodness of fit 
for our measurement model is sufficient.  
 
Table 4: Goodness of fit indexes 
 
Hu and Bentler (1999)"Cutoff Criteria for Fit Indexes 
in Covariance Structure Analysis: Conventional 
Criteria Versus New Alternatives 
Table 5: Model Fit measures 
 
Composite reliability of all concepts exceeds the .70 
benchmark for all constructs. So, high levels of 
internal consistency reliability have been 
demonstrated among all six reflective latent variables. 
As a result, the lower indicator reliability of CR can 
be accepted. 
 
Convergent validity is acceptable as almost all factor 
loadings exceed the 0.60 benchmark. For all factors, 
the AVE was above 0.50 except for authority, which 
was close at 0.485. However, as this factor is 
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minimally correlated with the other factors in the 
model, and because the reliability score (0.823) was 
greater than 0.700, we felt this was admissible (i.e., 
while it is not especially strong internally, it is, at 
least, a reliable and distinct construct within our 
model).  Fornell and Larcker (1981)suggest that the 
square root of AVE in each latent variable can be 
used to establish discriminant validity, if this value is 
larger than other correlation values among the latent 
variables. The square roots of average variances 
extracted (AVEs) are shown on diagonal, in bold in 
the Table 5. The table indicates that discriminant 
validity is well established. 
 
4.3 Moderating Model 
 
The final model (Fig. 2) supports the hypotheses at 5% 
significant level. The prediction that Firms with 
greater investment or higher asset specificity will 
indeed pursue greater level of vertical integration 
(H1) was supported with (p = 0.012 < 0.05). 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that firms with higher 
transaction uncertainty pursue higher level of vertical 
integration was also supported with (p = 0.023 < 
0.05).While H3 predicted that firms with greater 
transaction frequency pursue greater level of vertical 
integration was equally supported with (p = 0.033 < 
0.05).  
To test the interaction hypotheses we first 
standardized the endogeneous variables and then 
created product variables. Both interaction paths 
Asset_x_Uncert and Asset_x_Freq were found to be 
significant at 5% level as shown in table 6. The 
graphs of the interactions are depicted in figs 3 and 4 
below. Thus the results of the interactive 
relationships also support the hypotheses. The 
prediction of H4 that, positive influence of 
transaction uncertainty on vertical integration 
becomes stronger when asset specificity increases 
was supported with (p = 0.021 < 0.05). The 
prediction of H5 that the positive influence of 
transaction frequency on vertical integration becomes 
stronger when asset specificity increases was also 
supported with (p = 0.024 < 0.05).  
 
 
 
 
Fig.2: Statistical moderating model 
 
The conditional effect of Uncertainty on Degree of 
Integration assetbbDI  23  
The conditional effect of Frequency on Degree of 
Integration assetbbDI  45  
 
Table 6: Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - 
Default model) 
 
 
 
Fig.3: Interaction effect of asset specificity and 
transaction frequency on degree integration 
Asset Specificity strengthens the positive relationship 
between Frequency and Degree of integration. 
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Fig.4: Interaction effect of asset specificity and 
transaction uncertainty on degree integration 
 
 Asset Specificity strengthens the positive 
relationship between Uncertainty and Degree of 
integration. 
 
Table 7: Standardized Regression Loads 
 
 
5.0: Conclusion, Limitation and Future 
Research 
 
The study sheds light into how inter-firms 
relationships boundary choices are determined. 
Appropriate boundary choice appears to pose serious 
challenges to firms. The results of this paper suggest 
that firms with greater investment or higher asset 
specificity pursue greater level of vertical integration 
in the telecommunication industry. This results is 
consistent with the findings of Poppo and Zenger 
(2002). In their study, they found that increasing 
asset specificity leads to diminishing effectiveness of 
market governance because markets lack effective 
mechanisms for resolving coordination problems and 
opportunism in specialized exchanges. Also, the 
findings that authority relationships and hierarchical 
control procedures through vertical integration are 
assumed to have greater safeguarding capabilities 
and are viewed as the solution to the problem of 
transaction opportunisms(Geyskens et al., 2006; Van 
de Vrande et al., 2006; Van de Vrande et al., 2009). 
These findings support the predictions of TCT 
by(Oliver E Williamson, 1985). 
Also, the results that firms with higher transaction 
uncertainty pursue higher level of vertical integration 
is consistent with Oliver E Williamson (1985) 
prediction that uncertainty of transactions positively 
influence degree of integration. 
 Hypothesis 3 predicted that firms with greater 
transaction frequency pursue greater  level of vertical 
integration was equally supported with the findings 
that an increased frequency of transaction will reduce 
the information asymmetry between the 
organizations making hierarchical mechanisms more 
appropriate (Van de Vrande et al., 2006; Van de 
Vrande et al., 2009).This finding is consistent with 
the TCT prediction by(Oliver E Williamson, 1985).  
The results of the interactive relationships also 
support the hypotheses. The prediction of H4 that, 
positive influence of transaction uncertainty on 
vertical integration becomes stronger when asset 
specificity increases, is consistent with the studies of 
(Anderson, 1996; Coles & Hesterly, 1998; Walker & 
Weber, 1987). These results support the assertion of  
Oliver E Williamson (1985)when he stated that there 
is an interactive relationship between uncertainty, 
asset specificity, and the degree of integration. Oliver 
E Williamson (1985) specifically asserts that 
uncertainty enables greater opportunism in markets 
and hybrids only when asset specific investments are 
present. 
In the same manner, the prediction of H5 for a 
positive influence of transaction frequency on 
vertical integration becomes stronger when asset 
specificity increases was supported .This results is 
consistent with the studies of(Widener & Selto, 
1999) . In their study, they showed that firms tend to 
use internal staff when frequent transactions are 
joined with asset specific investments. Specifically, 
they found that the combined presence of frequency 
and asset specific investments explained 53% of the 
variance in degree of integration decisions. In 
addition, Masters and Miles (2002)found that when 
recurring tasks require some level of expertise (i.e., 
human asset specificity), most firms preferred 
hierarchies to other modes of governance. Thus, 
support has been found for the explanation of 
boundary choice that, when frequency and asset 
specificity are joined, firms favour increased 
integration to reduce transaction costs and the 
resulting adaptability problems.  
The research in this paper has a few limitations, 
which provide opportunity for future research. A first 
limitation is that, the study focussed on a single 
theory to find the determinants of governance 
structure. The study used only transaction cost theory. 
We believe this theory will provide the fundamental 
dimensions necessary to fully achieve our objectives. 
The study might have been enriched if we had 
extended our theory with the resource base theory. 
The resource base theory sheds light into why some 
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asset specific investments are more possible to be 
governed by higher degree of integration than other 
types. The resource base theory suggests that assets 
that are scarce, very difficult to being replaced, 
difficult to copy and also of value can bring about 
sustained organizational leverage. 
A second likely limitation is that, the research study 
treated uncertainty as mono dimensional construct 
and failed to differentiate between types of 
uncertainty. Uncertainty is now appreciated as a 
multi-dimensional construct. It is widely identified as, 
volume, environmental, behavioural and 
technological uncertainty. Each type of uncertainty 
could possibly impact governance mode, thus 
shaping governance choice.  
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